Understanding Cyber Security Perceptions Related to Information Risk in a Healthcare Setting by Sedlack, Derek
 Cyber Security Strategy in Healthcare 
  
 Twenty-second Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Diego, 2016 1 
Understanding Cyber Security Perceptions 
Related to Information Risk in a Healthcare 
Setting 
 
Derek J. Sedlack 





Healthcare organizations are facing an information system expansion for efficiency, for effectiveness, and 
to enhance profitability. We cannot expect all healthcare employees to become information systems or 
security experts; however, human perceptions of risks and the identification of those risks require an 
organizational approach. A case study analysis of physicians practicing through a multi-million dollar 
healthcare organization is presented to better understand their group perceptions of risk relating to the 
organization’s information strategy. 
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Introduction 
Healthcare organizations are facing an information system expansion for efficiency, for effectiveness, and 
to enhance profitability. Pressures increase from governance to secure big data (Hashem, Yaqoob, Anuar, 
Mokhtar, Gani, & Khan, 2015), respond to client demands for high quality service regardless of location 
(Azarm-Daigle, Kuziemsky, & Peyton, 2015), and appropriate finances to meet these demands (Wendel, 
O’Donohue, & Serratt, 2014).  
Attempts to offset risks largely involve five decades of highly technical approaches (von Solms, 2000) 
such as encryption (Zhou, Cau, Dong, Xiong, & Vasilakos, 2015) or outsourcing to data centers that costs 
billions (DCSM, 2014) and only hope to keep pace with data adversaries (Hazari, Hargrave, & Clenney, 
2008). Non-sensible work practices (Adams & Sasse, 1999) and a lack of expertise (Hazari et al., 2008; 
Rotvold, 2008) only enhance healthcare security challenges since ideal conditions have well informed 
employees that take an active role toward better securing information (Siponen, 2001). 
We cannot expect all healthcare employees to become information systems or security experts; however, 
human perceptions of risks and the identification of those risks require an organizational approach (Islam 
& Dong, 2008). Electronic Medical Records (EMR) mandated by the government require information 
systems. Increasingly sophisticated diagnosis (Bayraktar, Karan, & Gümüşkaya, 2011) through expanding 
networks (Alemdar & Ersoy, 2010) require healthcare professionals to use increasingly sophisticated 
information systems. Different technology use through role or responsibility (Yoshioka, Yates, & 
Orlikowsk, 2002) shapes views, or frames of groups into distinct pockets (Bijker, 1987; Davidson, 2006; 
Vaast, 2007) that commonly lead to misidentified risk severity resulting in inaccurate tradeoffs relative to 
the organization. 
In this research, a case study analysis of physicians practicing through a multi-million dollar healthcare 
organization was conducted to better understand their group perceptions of risk relating to the 
organization’s information strategy. Interviews with the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) were 
conducted in his office and follow-up discussions with physicians took place at their private practices or in 
a neutral setting. This study analyzed factors contributing to the overall information security posture of 
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the healthcare organization since visiting physicians create, modify, and access healthcare privacy 
information, locally and remotely, that impacts the organization. Before beginning the case study, a 
thorough literature review was conducted and general questions were developed for interviews with 
practicing physicians. 
Literature Review 
The world generates information at a manic pace, especially in industries like Healthcare where data 
collection and storage are mandated. While some information systems are purposefully designed 
integrated information system components with adequate control, many are ad-hoc or built on legacy 
systems too expensive to completely replace, leaving costly security holes or risks that organizations have 
trouble adequately assessing (Williams, 2013). Sophisticated technical controls alone have not worked 
(Hazari, Hargrave, & Clenney, 2008) and researchers recommend behavioral aspects to provide better 
information security over technical approaches alone (Baskerville, 1993, 2003; Baskerville & Stage, 1996). 
Managing risk has numerous approaches (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002; Briand, et al., 1998; Courtney, 1977; 
Kallman, 2007; Peltier, 2001; Vidalis, 2003; Whitman, 2003) toward identifying and mitigating the 
weakest link (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002; Whitman, 2003); however, probability data is 
largely problematic (Baskerville, 1993) in contextualized form (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), creating 
employee perception and business implementation voids. 
Organizational information system and resource controls are required (Peltier, 2001), but the more 
vexing problem is understanding user behavior relating to IT threats (Liang & Xue, 2009) and user 
framed perceptions relating to information security (Flechais & Sasse, 2009). These frames may 
transform information security by user actions inconsistent with organizational expectations (von Solms, 
2006) that weakens the overall security posture, including people and process deficiencies (Stewart, 
2004). These salient, shifting frames diverge from organizational strategic designs from misuse through 
ignorance of intrinsic complexities (Siponen, 2001), political and social influences (Sanford & 
Bhattacherjee, 2008), tacked-on job responsibilities without adequate resources (Wei, Wang, & Ju, 2005), 
and/or management and worker power struggles (McGovern & Hicks, 2004). As Healthcare shifts from a 
societal not-for-profit benefit toward a revenue focused business, IS security strategy requires a more 
holistic approach (Johnston & Hale, 2009) including policies, practices, and procedures. 
Physicians are presented with increasingly unreasonable or not sensible work practices, policies and 
procedures. They are asked by patients to instantly remember personal details including previous 
outcomes, medication lists from various sources (prescribed and homeopathic), and any relevant side-
effects. Hospitals expect up-to-date medical skills regardless workloads that may include visitation and 
private practice. Insurance companies expect physicians to eliminate their risks while maintaining best 
practices related to patient health. When such expectations, including information security adherence, 
present as task completion obstacles, they will either be ignored or circumvented in trade for task 
completion (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Katos & Furnell, 2008). Alternatively, physicians are turning toward 
technology to replace core memorization, cross-referenced pharmaceutical charts, and colleague 
consultations. This reliance on technology demands a more security conscious behavior, supported by 
simple and clear policies and procedures (Bhagyavati & Hicks, 2003; Craig, 1993; Jones & Lipton, 1975), 
especially when physicians are responsible in numerous locations that maintain different policies and 
procedures – possibly with some in conflict.  
Policy and procedural adherence do not guarantee appropriate behavior and the fabrication of sound 
protection mechanisms (Jones & Lipton, 1975) does not assure security. Security Education Training and 
Awareness (SETA) is an appropriate compliance mechanism (Choi, Kim, Goo, & Whitmore, 2008;  Roper, 
Grau, and Fischer, 2006; Siponen, 2001), but it does not deter disgruntled or beleaguered employees 
(Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002), or ensure comprehension. As increasingly sophisticated, 
invasive technologies are employed through Healthcare, finding enough appropriately trained/educated 
employees becomes challenging (Bacon & Tikekar, 2003), emphasizing how critical the structural reliance 
on a congruent information security strategy across differing frames; however, researchers struggle to 
identify a unified approach that accounts for employee turnover, incongruent professional training, 
varying competence levels, and other dynamic environmental conditions that negatively impact 
organizational information security effectiveness. This case study positions an alternative model that 
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focused on information strategy to address the organizational risk gaps contributing to the billion dollar 
misappropriated data market. 
Information Strategy 
A focus on data-related strategy is emphasized in structural standards (Gunther, Jochen, Ivantysynova, & 
Ziekow, 2009) and prior research (Sedlack & Tejay, 2011) indicated an importance for healthcare 
organizations to not only design and implement an appropriate strategy relating to information, but 
ensuring that everyone understands and abides by the prescribed tenets. The security or securing of 
information is referred to throughout literature as information security. Information assurance is a belief 
that said information is secured. Information assurance through the securing/security of information 
cannot be accomplished without formal instruction, or strategy. As such, this paper will approach 
information strategy as a comprehensive approach toward the secure and assurance of data, at rest, 
stored, processed, or transmitted related to the organization in this study, understanding that each of 
these areas respectfully qualify as fully independent research fields. 
Corporate Strategy 
The Healthcare industry has transformed from a single visit, single source treatment, to the demand for 
mobile access to longitudinal records from both patient and provider (Thilakanathan, Chen, Nepal, Calvo, 
& Alem, 2014). Independent practices are shifting to branch offices with affiliations to hospitals or larger 
healthcare organizations with an emphasis on business solvency and performance management that 
mirrors techniques previously associated with corporate executives (Bergeron, 2005). The cost benefit 
and ubiquitous access to life-saving cyberized data through Cloud Computing has not been ignored by the 
Healthcare industry (Wang, Chen, & Zhang, 2015) and shifting data to a remote cite does not eliminate 
organizational HIPAA requirements. As information systems infiltrate oncology, radiology, and most 
other facets of health-related business, due to EMR compliance or efficiency, an increased importance is 
placed on managing risks related to information nature, use, and strategy through technology.  
Healthcare Strategy 
An increased focus on information availability (Alemdar & Ersoy, 2010) through untethered networks 
(Azarm-Daigle, Kuziemsky, & Peyton, 2015) to feed data-intensive applications (Chen & Zhang, 2014) 
means an increased demand from providers to treat patients and patients expect more comprehensive 
treatment. Thilakanathan, Chen, Nepal, Calvo, and Alem, (2014) argue that Healthcare mobile devices are 
increasing in popularity. Physicians expect instant access to data and patients demand safer care due to 
larger available data sets. These data sets of personally identifiable information (PII) and anonymized big 
data for diagnosis and treatment are not isolated to the local office, hospital, or regional center, but used 
to share and collaborate over cloud-computing environments inter-organizationally (Fabian, Ermakova, & 
Junghanns, 2015). 
While there is discussion over data breach frequency (Edwards, Hofmeyr, & Forrest, 2015; Liu, Musen, & 
Chou, 2015), Healthcare data breaches cost yearly upwards of $55 billion and could point to an increasing 
attack sophistication (Edwards, Hofmeyr, & Forrest) such as the ransomware attack on Hollywood 
Presbyterian Medical Center that shut down information system functionality until hackers were paid a 
$17,000 bitcoin ransom from an initial $3.4M demand (Dvorak, 2016). Information systems designed to 
share information and protocols are largely of public construction through RFC, so how does an 
organization, specifically one responsible for human life, properly address information security and 
privacy concerns (Thilakanathan et al., 2014)?  
Perceptions of Risk 
While businesses always experience risk, this case study specifically focuses on how groups within 
organizations identify and interpret information risk through shared perceptions. Dynamic environments 
create incongruent perceptions (Giddens, 1984). Technological Frames of Reference (TFR) are an 
appropriate lens to study organizational incongruity (Davidson, 2006). Orlikowski and Gash (1994) found 
that Technological Frames of Reference (TFR) states member perceptions of organizational groups 
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coalesce into similar views, even if those views are incongruent with the organization. Organizations 
commonly create and publish polices and expect employees to memorize and interpret them 
appropriately. When employees cannot remember policies or misremember them, strategic misalignment 
occurs. Translating policies directly into procedures may adhere to regulatory compliance like HIPAA, but 
it reduces customer value (Jensen & Potts, 2004) since compliance procedures may not align with 
customer expectations such as inhibiting their access to certain information. Information technology must 
be initially configured, but over time that configuration may become misaligned with business strategy. 
Employees trained to particular IT standards may not adequately interpret those standards to properly 
align with organizational information strategy. Employees are sometimes expected to purchase, maintain, 
and use their own devices (BYOD) within the organizational infrastructure. Employees need to be trained 
in the relative technologies to understand how to properly assess risk and act accordingly in the best 
interest of the patient and organization (Lerchey & Paras, 2000). If they are not properly trained or 
educated, daily use may become misaligned with organizational demands. 
Employees that are over-exposed to risks may tune out (Adams & Sasse, 1999), but a lack of training may 
cause employee forgetfulness, misinterpretation, or disregard of real information risks, like broken 
authentication devices, weak passwords, or exposed confidential documentation. Many employees only 
intervene when risks appear severe (Stewart, 2004), like when a back door is left open or a non-employee 
asks for specific access to secured areas; however, what about leaving work unprotected at home or 
storing corporate data on an unprotected personal device? As physicians are asked to collect, store, 
analyze, and apply more patient data in increasingly mobile settings and patients demand higher quality 
care through healthcare information, their data and others, security and privacy of these electronic 
records become paramount (Fernandez-Aleman, Denor, Lozoya, & Toval, 2013). 
Case Study 
In order to understand perceptions of risk, we conducted interviews with several physicians with private 
practices and privileges at a large Healthcare organization in South Florida. As with many case-based 
analyses, these insights may not be representative. However, this sample is intended to provide a 
representative of similarly educated practitioners focused on delivering high quality care for their 
patients. The author anticipates the provided insights will prove helpful to researchers or practitioners 
studying information security gaps created by group perceptions related to risk. 
This case study was conducted from May 2010 to May 2011. The participants are from one large 
organization in the Healthcare industry, identified here as Hospital One (pseudonyms are provided for 
anonymity). Hospital One has been in operation for more than 30 years and sustains more than 500 
physicians and 1500 nurses and staff. Hospital One publically reported revenues of at least $100 million 
in 2010 and is part of a larger parent corporation with more than $2 billion in revenue for 2010, over 100 
contributing hospitals, and 100 surgical centers. Time and resources limited this study to only Hospital 
One from the larger group. In structured interviews, physicians were asked about their perceptions of risk 
related to information. The author focused on the nature of IT, the use of IT, and IT strategy. The nature 
of IT relates to inherent risks. Inherent risk is defined independently of use or intention. IT use relates to 
handled risk. Handled risk related to the implementation, application, or non-use. IT strategy is the 
rationale behind purchase and/or implementation.  
Case Hospital One 
In this case study, physician perceptions of risk related to information are discussed. Hospital One uses 
infrastructure (technology) and formal policies to adhere to government HIPAA mandates to protect 
client and organizational data. The CEO and staff represent a formal security committee to oversee the 
steering committee for: policy creation and review, consultant audits, new or changing requirements, and 
compliance oversight. The CISO is responsible for security policy creation and maintenance, policy 
enforcement, and overall information security related activities. Physicians have private practices and 
visiting privileges at Hospital One. The physicians are responsible for oversight and implementation of all 
information security aspects, technical, formal, and informal, but must adhere to Hospital One mandates.  
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Remote Access 
The CISO reported policy compliance the highest priority during this case study, but telling physicians 
that information security was important was frequently overtrumped with the saving of lives. The growing 
use of private physicians adhering to and understanding how their actions impacted Hospital One’s 
organizational information security strategy was a growing concern for management and security staff. 
Private practices needed to transfer and utilize patient information in daily business: financial, personally 
identifying, descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive. Several years before this case study, Hospital One did 
not authenticate information access, internally or externally. Prior to the case study, Hospital One used 
single-factor authentication through keyfobs. It was not possible to assign specific fobs to physicians, 
limiting auditing and controls. Keyfob issues were only identified upon complaint due to loss or operating 
issue. During the case study, Hospital One transitioned from single-factor fobs to two-factor, integrated 
software authentication.  
Policies 
Hospital One maintained no less than 14 working formal information security policies at the time of 
study, including: access establishment, modification, and termination; assigned security responsibility; 
data backup; documentation standards; email use; encryption; media disposal; media re-use; password 
management; removable storage media; security training and awareness; general security; and 
workstation use and security policies. Hospital One identified strategic information incongruity when 
individual policies were technically followed and data loss still occurred.  
The removable storage media and encryption policies were not combined to ensure data on removable 
storage media was encrypted during a form of data backup – transfer to Iron Mountain. Data was 
encrypted in-transit according to policy. The media were boxed and transferred to transport for archival 
according to policy, but the data or removable media were not encrypted.  According to the CISO, some 
media were reported lost during transit, providing access to patient data to whoever obtained the media. 
Corrective action was mandatory online training for related personnel to both understand and prove 
information policy congruency. Employees generally understood that reading the policy would ensure 
compliance, but the training discussed inherent risks associated with removable media and why it was 
important to consider risk outside one’s immediate job description or during the completion of a single 
task. Physicians better understood how encryption worked and why Hospital One needed to encrypt data. 
Policies were also moved to a central portal online and linked using HTML hyperlinks. This allowed 
employees to quickly access new material or clarify cross-referenced policies for a more comprehensive 
overview of Hospital One information strategy. 
The workstation use and encryption policies stated that communications between private practice and 
Hospital One must be encrypted. Since the remote access software used encryption, the policy was 
followed. The CISO reported that explicit audit tracking was available since physicians authenticated 
using blanket keyfobs. Loss of the keyfob meant expensive and time intensive replacement measures. 
Some fobs just stopped working. The CISO declared that solution as, “the fob that never went away”. Once 
issued, fobs were never disabled due to a lack of associated accurate reporting. Physicians were reported 
to share fobs frequently with other physicians and staff, for convenience or due to fob theft/loss, making 
individual physician access tracking impossible.  
Corrective action was a transition away from single-factor authentication (keyfob) to two-factor 
authentication (username + password). Physicians that lost their keyfob would frequently use a shared 
keyfob with other physicians. While the fob provided technical security and using the fob was in 
compliance with policies, physicians and their staff didn’t understand why it was important for them to 
authenticate any time information was transferred or why they should not share credentials. Switching to 
integrated two-factor authentication corrected the inherent risks associated with shared fobs since 
physicians were less likely to share a password. Physicians also understood that unique credentials could 
be individually tracked and audited. While physicians know about HIPAA and understand it helps protect 
client data, few understood that Hospital One was required to track each transaction for direct 
accountability. When physicians were made aware that each change was tracked for audit as well as 
control and the associated HHS violation fines, they asked for an easy method to reset their password to 
remain in compliance. Forgotten passwords could be changed through the service desk, or a new 
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authentication portal at minimal expense and inconvenience. If passwords were not used or were no 
longer viable through employment termination, an automated policy could disable access. The CISO 
reported an initial timeframe of 90 days based on historical employment records. A new sanction policy 
was created to provide clear and deliberate penalties for non-compliance. 
The workstation use policy stated that only authorized users can access Hospital One systems. In private 
practice, physicians would logon in the morning and use that single authentication instance to commit 
transactions throughout the day. Even though the physician was responsible for policy compliance, it was 
not possible to determine who or when information was accessed remotely, only logon and logoff fob IDs 
and times.  
Corrective action was implementing session inactivity timeouts of 90 seconds. Physicians demanded no 
timeouts because they needed access to financial and health-related information throughout the day and 
they were not previously bound by a session time requirement. Hospital One management discussed the 
strategic requirements of session timeouts with physicians. Times were variable and should reflect 
minimum times to complete required actions along with maximum idle times when physicians or staff 
were likely to leave a workstation unattended. Internal Hospital One stations were assigned 15 minute 
session timeouts due to potential public accessibility. Due to integration authentication credentials, 
Hospital One created shorter internal session timeouts consistent with high traffic areas and longer 
timeouts for more controlled, physician private practices. 
Mobile Observation 
One physician using their iPhone during follow-up discussions appeared to be accessing an application. 
The author asked if they used their phone to access protected medical data. The physician excitedly 
described a pharmaceutical application that not only saved them the time of looking up side-effects per 
patient, but could be directly tied to patient allergies and other prescriptions in the patient’s exam room, 
at the hospital, or while they were otherwise away from traditional computer access. Additionally, any 
added medication would automatically cross-reference interrelated side-effects without the physician 
having to “memorize new drugs and side effects or incompatibilities that come out each month”. The 
author asked if the information was ever incorrect, inaccurate, or could be purposefully misrepresented to 
the detriment of a patient. The physician appeared appalled at the notion and assured the researcher that 
the application was always up-to-date, accurate, and secure. 
Unified Approach 
While the researcher was not made aware of intent from Hospital One to request procedural congruence 
between the hospital and physician’s private practice, the unified access method and conversion of static 
policies into Hyper-Linked, web-available forms demonstrated a shift toward more holistic compliance. 
Expansion of policies and/or procedures more readily available and consumable by an increasingly 
mobile society appears focused on compliance and comprehension over checkbox completion. Hospital 
One investment in training that can be inexpensively customized by role, responsibility, and learning 
modality will help ensure compliance with information security strategy.  
Conclusion 
The primary focus of Healthcare is not information security; however, an increasing reliance on 
information systems for primary and acute care was accentuated in the malware attack on Hollywood 
Presbyterian Medical Center, where even life support could have been shut down. Mobile data access 
becomes increasingly critical in a mobile society predicated on instant access for themselves and their 
service providers. A growing hunger for protected medical data to diagnose and remediate reduces an 
organization’s ability to properly and effectively secure patient records, at rest or in use. An increasing 
reliance on immediate data in triage and surgery means a burdened reliance on information systems. 
While the lack of healthcare data could inhibit or deflect proper care, the lack of information systems in a 
technologically reliant system is equally damaging. This case study highlighted the importance of 
employees understanding appropriate technical capabilities and use to effectively support the 
organization’s information security strategy. If the physician improperly uses the technology or increases 
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organizational risk through improper configuration, complex information security measures may be 
readily circumvented.  
Securing data appears to be an uphill battle and while it may be unreasonable to ask all Healthcare 
professionals to become information system or security experts, properly training them to perceive risks 
congruent with organizational strategy may reduce significant gaps that would serve to improve a 
structure’s information security posture. When organizational members better understand technological 
capabilities and use them consistent with organizational information security strategy, applied 
information security improves. When members understand and discuss different technological 
approaches based on role and responsibility, information security alignment improves. When 
organizational groups/members are able to properly assess and respond to information risks congruent 
with organizational effectiveness, the information security strategy is supported. 
Discussions 
The independent nature of both academic and professional training will likely continue to separate the 
technically trained or savvy and those responsible for technical use, but lacking formal technical 
instruction or education. While it is unrealistic to expect all employees to become technically proficient 
with each tool, operating system, and security artifact briefly encountered, organizations should hire, 
train, and design information security strategies around organizational objectives. Additionally, when 
employees are better able to identify and assess information risks, reported risks increase thus 
increasingly the likelihood of mitigation.  
Technological Frames of Reference has proven a useful research tool toward understanding individual 
and role-based perceptions of risk relating to information security strategy in this Healthcare setting. 
Expanding research to measure the effectiveness of strategic alignment or realignment is warranted. 
Understanding risk perceptions correlating to education, gender, or other demographics would allow 
researchers to design a more accurate framework and practitioners to continue improving their 
information security posture through training, workforce positioning, and/or hiring practices. 
Similar research in additional industry settings: such as finance, manufacturing, telecommunications, and 
education would provide additional data toward designing a unified approach that could reduce billions in 
data losses annually. Other demographic or personal factors commonly associated within each industry 
may contribute to risk perception incongruity. Science would also benefit to understand if similar 
corrective actions in other fields/industries had similar results. Retail giant Target’s data weakness was 
exposed through a vendor, unlikely to share aligned information security perceptions with Target, 
although the common interest of securing confidential data should be similar across all organizations in 
every industry and should serve as a warning to companies outsourcing services with access to any 
integrated infrastructure.  
As the Internet of Things rapidly expands to meet insatiable customer demands for instant data, private 
data custodians like the Healthcare industry will feel increased pressure to secure technology specifically 
designed for insecure procedures. Information technology was designed to share information and is 
largely built on public requests for comments through working groups. Secure systems limit extensibility 
and increase access times through stricter access control measures and administration, increasing 
operational costs that reduce corporate investment returns. When users of technology better identify with 
the organization’s information security strategy, employees or clients, both company and consumer 
benefit. Data breaches impacting younger information system users, like the Sony PlayStation breach, 
should be leveraged to inform and educate about information security strategy as much as admonish 
purposefully ineffective designs. 
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